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Abstract 
I develop a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. This theory provides new answers to 
two prominent questions in the trade policy literature: first, what is the purpose of trade 
negotiations? And second, what is the role played by the fundamental GATT/WTO principles 
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination? Relative to the standard terms-of-trade theory of 
GATT/WTO negotiations, my theory makes two main contributions: first, it builds on a ‘new 
trade’ model rather than the neoclassical trade model and therefore sheds new light on 
GATT/WTO negotiations between similar countries. Second, it relies on a production 
relocation externality rather than the terms-of-trade externality and therefore demonstrates 
that the terms-of-trade externality is not the only trade policy externality which can be 
internalized in GATT/WTO negotiations. 
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1 Introduction
International trade has been liberalized dramatically since the end of World War II.
According to WTO estimates, the average ad valorem tari¤ on manufacturing goods
has been reduced from over 40 percent to below 4 percent during this time period.
This dramatic liberalization was largely the result of a sequence of successful rounds
of trade negotiations governed by the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT)
and later its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 The GATT/WTO is an
institution regulating trade negotiations through a set of prenegotiated articles. The
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination are usually considered to be the essence
of these articles. Generally speaking, the former requires that trade policy changes keep
changes in imports equal across trading partners and the latter stipulates that the same
tari¤ must be applied against all trading partners for any given traded product.2
In this paper, I develop a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. This theory
provides new answers to two prominent questions in the trade policy literature: rst,
what is the purpose of trade negotiations? And second, what is the role played by the
fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination?
My benchmark is, of course, the standard neoclassical theory of GATT/WTO ne-
gotiations. Its main idea goes back to Johnson (1953-54) and builds on the classic
optimal tari¤ argument:3 in a neoclassical environment, each country has an incentive
to impose import tari¤s in order to improve its terms-of-trade. However, if all countries
impose import tari¤s in an attempt to improve their terms-of-trade, no country actually
1According to WTO statistics, industrial countries have cut their tari¤s on industrial products by an
average 36 percent during the rst ve GATT rounds (1942-62), an average 37 percent in the Kennedy
Round (1964-67), an average 33 percent in the Tokyo Round (1973-79), and an average 38 percent in the
Uruguay Round (1986-94). There is some controversy about the scope of GATT/WTO negotiations.
Rose (2004) nds that GATT/WTO members did not benet more from GATT/WTO negotiations
than non-members. However, Subramanian and Wei (2007), and Tomsz et al. (2007) argue that this
nding is not robust.
2 I adopt here Bagwell and Staigers (1999) interpretation of the principles of reciprocity and nondis-
crimination which I will discuss in more detail later on.
3The classic optimal tari¤ argument itself is actually much older than Johnson (1953-54). See Irwin
(1996) for a history of thought.
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succeeds and ine¢ ciently high tari¤s prevail. This ine¢ ciency then creates incentives
for cooperative trade policy setting. Essentially, tari¤s entail an international terms-of-
trade externality and trade negotiations serve to internalize this externality.4 Grossman
and Helpman (1995) extended this main argument to the case in which governments
are subject to pressure from domestic interest groups. They demonstrated that tari¤s
continue to entail a terms-of-trade externality in this case which can be internalized
in trade negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) built on this literature and devel-
oped a unied framework of GATT/WTO negotiations. In a very general neoclassical
trade model in which governments have preferences consistent with all leading politi-
cal economy approaches, they showed that the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of
reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be interpreted as simple negotiation rules which
help governments internalize the terms-of-trade externality. They also demonstrated
that the terms-of-trade externality is the only trade policy externality which can arise
in this environment thus making it the only trade policy externality GATT/WTO ne-
gotiations can be about.5
Instead of analyzing GATT/WTO negotiations in a neoclassical environment, my
new trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations builds on a Krugman (1980) new
trademodel. This allows me to make two main contributions. First, my new trade
theory sheds new light on GATT/WTO negotiations between similar countries. The
neoclassical trade model features constant returns to scale and perfect competition
and is the leading explanation of trade in di¤erent goods between di¤erent countries.
The Krugman (1980) model instead features increasing returns to scale and monop-
4See also Kuga (1973), Mayer (1981), Riezman (1982), Dixit (1987), Kennan and Riezman (1988),
Maggi (1999), and Syropoulos (2002) for other important contributions to that literature.
5An alternative theory of trade agreements was o¤ered by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). It
stresses commitment considerations, pointing out that trade agreements may help governments commit
vis-à-vis domestic special interest groups. It di¤ers fundamentally both from the standard terms-of-
trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations as well as from my new trade theory of GATT/WTO
negotiations in that it does not view trade negotiations as a means to internalize an international
trade policy externality. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show how this commitment theory can be
combined with the standard terms-of-trade theory. See also Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Mitra
(2002).
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olistic competition and is the leading explanation of trade in similar goods between
similar countries.6 Both models thus address entirely distinct dimensions of interna-
tional trade and it seems unnatural to conne attention to just one of these dimensions
when studying the functioning of GATT/WTO negotiations. Most importantly, while
a neoclassical theory of GATT/WTO negotiations seems well-suited for understanding
GATT/WTO negotiations between di¤erent countries, it is not clear that this is also
true for GATT/WTO negotiations between similar countries. Indeed, as I demonstrate
in this paper, both the purpose of GATT/WTO negotiations as well as the role played
by the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination can
be quite di¤erent in a new tradeenvironment. Second, my new tradetheory high-
lights a production relocation externality which is independent of the terms-of-trade
externality stressed in the standard theory. In fact, I make assumptions in my model
which serve to x world prices and thus eliminate any role for terms-of-trade e¤ects. I
thereby demonstrate that, contrary to one of the standard theorys main conclusions,
the terms-of-trade externality is not the only trade policy externality which can be in-
ternalized in GATT/WTO negotiations. This is especially important given that some
economists have questioned the real-world relevance of terms-of-trade e¤ects. Bagwell
and Staiger (2002: 181) summarize that "many economists are skeptical as to the prac-
tical relevance of terms-of-trade considerations for actual trade policy negotiations".
Krugman (1997: 113), for example, argues that "this optimal tari¤ argument plays al-
most no role in real-world trade disputes".7 Be that as it may, I do not aim to disprove
the importance of terms-of-trade e¤ects.8 Instead, I hope to strengthen the literatures
most fundamental claim that economic logic can be used to make sense of GATT/WTO
negotiations by providing an alternative and I think plausible economic explanation of
6See Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Antweiler and Treer (2005), and Debaere
(2005) for evidence on the importance of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition for
explaining international trade ows.
7See Ethier (2002) and Regan (2006) for more examples.
8 In fact, recent studies by Bagwell and Staiger (2006a) and Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (forthcom-
ing) suggest that terms-of-trade considerations do play a role in governmentstari¤ choices.
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GATT/WTO negotiations.
My main idea is that GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reci-
procity and nondiscrimination help governments escape a production relocation driven
prisoners dilemma: in my model, each government has an incentive to impose import
tari¤s in order to expand the domestic manufacturing sector at the expense of foreign
manufacturing sectors. In particular, a unilateral increase in import tari¤s makes foreign
manufacturing goods more expensive relative to domestic manufacturing goods in the
domestic market so that domestic consumers shift expenditure towards domestic manu-
facturing goods. As a consequence, domestic manufacturing rms sell more thus making
prots and foreign manufacturing rms sell less thus making losses. This triggers entry
into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of foreign manufacturing sectors
so that more of the worlds manufacturing goods are produced by domestic rms. The
domestic government values such production relocations since they increase domestic
welfare. This is because they reduce the domestic price index by ensuring that less of
the goods consumed by domestic consumers are subject to trade costs. However, if all
governments impose import tari¤s in an attempt to host more of the worlds manufac-
turing rms, no government actually succeeds and ine¢ ciently high tari¤s prevail. This
is why governments are stuck in a production relocation driven prisoners dilemma if
tari¤s are set noncooperatively. GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination help governments escape this prisoners dilemma.
Essentially, the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination jointly ensure that tari¤
changes no longer entail production relocations and thereby neutralize all trade policy
externalities. This is because, under these principles, tari¤-induced changes in domestic
consumer expenditure towards or away from domestic manufacturing goods are exactly
o¤set by changes in foreign consumer expenditure away from or towards these goods so
that tari¤ changes then leave the number of manufacturing rms constant in all coun-
tries. By neutralizing all trade policy externalities, the principles of reciprocity and
5
nondiscrimination not only guide countries away from the ine¢ cient noncooperative
equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries. But they
also secure negotiated tari¤ concessions by eliminating all incentives to reverse them.
While I am, I believe, the rst to study trade negotiations in a Krugman (1980)
model, I am by no means the rst to study trade policy in this model. In Krugman
(1980) type environments, import tari¤s can improve welfare in two ways. First, by
reducing the domestic price index as I discussed above. This price index e¤ect was
rst highlighted by Venables (1987). And second, by improving the terms-of-trade as
in the neoclassical trade model. This terms-of-trade e¤ect was rst highlighted by Gros
(1987).9 As should be clear from the above discussion, the former channel underlies my
new tradetheory of GATT/WTO negotiations. To isolate it, I follow Helpman and
Krugman (1989) in developing a version of the Krugman (1980) model which does not
feature terms-of-trade e¤ects.10
I develop my new tradetheory in the remainder of this paper. In the next sec-
tion, I introduce the basic two-country model and use this model to establish that the
noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient. I also demonstrate how trade negotiations
governed by the principle of reciprocity help countries overcome this ine¢ ciency in a
way which monotonically increases welfare in both countries. In the third section, I
then develop a three-country extension of this basic model and use this extended model
to show that the principle of reciprocity alone is now no longer su¢ cient to help coun-
tries overcome the ine¢ cient equilibrium in a way which monotonically improves welfare
in all countries. I also demonstrate that, if the principle of reciprocity is augmented
9The mechanism is basically the same as in the neoclassical model. An extra twist is that a tari¤ can
now also improve welfare by correcting the domestic distortion originating from the monopoly pricing
of domestic manufacturing rms. Gros (1987) shows that therefore the optimal tari¤ is positive even
if the country is so small that it has no market power in world markets. See also Flam and Helpman
(1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989).
10Venables (1987) considers a version of the Krugman (1980) model which does not feature terms-of-
trade e¤ects. He studies unilateral trade policy only. Gros (1987) considers a version of the Krugman
(1980) model which features only terms-of-trade e¤ects. Besides studying unilateral trade policy he also
characterizes the noncooperative trade policy equilibrium. Neither Venables (1987) nor Gros (1987)
consider trade negotiations.
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with the principle of nondiscrimination, they then together serve this purpose. In the
fourth section, I explore whether preferential trade agreements which are allowed under
GATT/WTO regulations as an exception to the principle of nondiscrimination under-
mine the functioning of multilateral GATT/WTO negotiations. In the nal section, I
then conclude.
2 Basic model
2.1 Setup
There are two countries: Home and Foreign. Variables relating to Foreign are identied
by an asterisk. Consumers have access to a continuum of di¤erentiated manufactur-
ing goods and a single homogeneous outside good. Preferences over these goods are
identical in both countries. They are given by the following utility functions
U =
24 n+nZ
0
m (i)
 1
 di
35

 1
Y 1 ,  > 1 (1)
U =
24 n+nZ
0
m (j)
 1
 dj
35

 1
Y 1 ,  > 1 (2)
where m (i) denotes consumption of a di¤erentiated manufacturing good, Y denotes
consumption of the homogeneous outside good, n is the number of manufacturing
goods produced,  is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods, and 
is the share of income spent on manufacturing goods. Technologies are also identical in
both countries. They are summarized by the following (inverse) production functions
lM = f + cqM (3)
lM = f + cqM (4)
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lY = qY (5)
lY = qY (6)
where lM is the labor requirement for producing qM units of a manufacturing good,
lY is the labor requirement for producing qY units of the outside good, f denotes
the xed labor requirement of manufacturing production, and c denotes the marginal
labor requirement of manufacturing production. The manufacturing goods market is
monopolistically competitive whereas the outside good market is perfectly competitive.
Trade costs apply only to manufacturing goods and are of the Samuelson (1952) iceberg
type.11 In particular, for one unit of a manufacturing good to arrive in the other country,
 units must be shipped and the remainder melts away in transit. These iceberg
trade costs  are further decomposed into transport costs , which are identical across
countries, and trade barriers  , which may be di¤erent across countries. These trade
barriers are policy instruments and the key variables of the analysis. For concreteness,
I refer to them as tari¤s in the following but they can really reect any policy-induced
impediment to trade.12 I also restrict  <  , where  is some arbitrarily large but nite
upper bound. This nite upper bound is purely introduced for technical convenience.
Removing it would somewhat complicate the exposition without changing the results
in any interesting way (see appendix A1 for a detailed discussion of this). Hence,
 =  +  ,  > 1,     0 (7)
11As will become clear shortly, the price index e¤ect on which I build my new trade theory of
GATT/WTO negotiations is closely related to the home market e¤ect. Davis (1999) shows that in
simple setups like the one developed here, the home market e¤ect disappears if outside good sector
trade costs are su¢ ciently high. However, Krugman and Venables (1999) demonstrate that this no
longer holds in more general environments. See Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1998), Davis and
Weinstein (1999, 2003), Head and Ries (2001), and Hanson and Xiang (2004) for evidence on the home
market e¤ect.
12One particularity of tari¤s relative to other trade barriers is that they generate tari¤ revenue. I
abstract from tari¤ revenue by considering iceberg trade barriers which is essential for the models
tractability.
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 =  + ,  > 1,     0 (8)
Finally, I also make the following two additional assumptions: rst, I assume that the
manufacturing sector is always active in both countries. This requires transport costs
to be su¢ ciently large (see appendix A2 for the precise parameter restriction on ).
Second, I assume that the outside good sector is always active in both countries. This
requires the demand for manufacturing goods to be su¢ ciently small (see again appendix
A2 for the precise parameter restriction on ). The former assumption ensures that
countries can never attract all manufacturing rms through trade policy and thereby
eliminates uninteresting corner solutions. The latter assumption ensures, together with
the assumptions made on market structure, outside good technology, preferences, and
trade costs that there is no role for terms-of-trade e¤ects in this environment. I comment
further on this latter point below.
2.2 No trade policy
Consider now the equilibrium at Home and Foreign, exogenously xing tari¤s at some
level. Choose pY = 1 and notice that this implies w = w = 1, where w is the wage rate,
since the outside good sector is always active in both countries, the outside good market
is perfectly competitive, the outside good is produced using the above technology, and
is freely traded among countries. As is well-known, utility maximization with the above
preferences then yields the following demands for the outside good
Y = (1  )L (9)
Y  = (1  )L (10)
and the following demands for each manufacturing good
m (i) +m (i) = L
p (i) 
G1 
+ L1 
p (i) 
G1 
(11)
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m (j) +m (j) = L1 
p (j) 
G1 
+ L
p (j) 
G1 
(12)
where the former is the demand facing a Home manufacturing rm, the latter is the
demand facing a Foreign manufacturing rm, p (i) denotes the ex-factory price of a
manufacturing good, and the price indices are given by
G =
24 nZ
0
p (i)1  di+
nZ
0
[p (j)]1  dj
35
1
1 
(13)
G =
24 nZ
0
[p (i)]1  di+
nZ
0
p (j)1  dj
35
1
1 
(14)
Since these manufacturing demand functions have a constant price elasticity of , prot-
maximization implies that manufacturing rms charge a constant mark-up over marginal
costs so that
p (i) = p (j) =
c
   1  p (15)
which implies that the price indices simplify to
G = p

n+ n1 
 1
1  (16)
G = p

n1  + n
 1
1  (17)
Free entry drives manufacturing rms prots down to zero leading to the following
break-even outputs
q = q =
f (   1)
c
(18)
and hence the following break-even labor demands
l = l = f (19)
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Manufacturing market clearing thus requires
q = L
p 
G1 
+ L
1 p 
G1 
(20)
q = L
1 p 
G1 
+ L
p 
G1 
(21)
These manufacturing market clearing conditions can be solved for the equilibrium price
indices
G =
24 qp  1  1 
L
h
1  ()1 
i
35 1 1 (22)
G =
24 qp  1  1 
L
h
1  ()1 
i
35 1 1 (23)
These equilibrium price indices can then be solved for the equilibrium numbers of man-
ufacturing rms
n =

qp

L
1  1   
L1 
1  1 

(24)
n =

qp

L
1  1   
L1 
1  1 

(25)
Notice that this implies that the world number of manufacturing rms is always constant
and given by13
n+ n =
 (L+ L)
qp
(26)
Notice further that, given the above demands, the indirect utility functions are
V =  (1  )(1 ) LG  (27)
13This is because world expenditure on manufacturing goods is constant and given by  (L+ L)
and rm sales are constant and given by qp. This, of course, depends on the particular functional
form assumptions made above. It is not essential for the analysis but serves to cleanly illustrate the
tari¤-induced production relocation e¤ect which underlies this new tradetheory of GATT/WTO ne-
gotiations.
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V  =  (1  )(1 ) LG  (28)
so that each countrys welfare is decreasing in its manufacturing price index. Notice
nally that, from equation (15), world prices are xed in this environment so that there
can be no role for terms-of-trade e¤ects.14 This completes the derivation of the basic
model.
2.3 Noncooperative trade policy
Consider now trade policy if tari¤s are set noncooperatively. I assume throughout that
governments choose trade policy in an attempt to maximize their citizenswelfare. In the
following, I characterize the noncooperative equilibrium in two steps: rst, I show that
the noncooperative equilibrium involves maximum protection. Second, I demonstrate
that the noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
Thus, notice rst that the noncooperative equilibrium involves maximum protection
since each government always has an incentive to increase its tari¤. This is because
each countrys price index is always decreasing in its own tari¤, as can be seen from
equations (22) and (23). Underlying this are two opposing e¤ects of the own tari¤ on
the own price index. In the following, I refer to these e¤ects as import price e¤ect and
production relocation e¤ect, respectively. On the one hand, an own tari¤ simply makes
imported goods more expensive thereby increasing the own price index. On the other
hand, an own tari¤ leads to a relocation of manufacturing production from the foreign
manufacturing sector towards the domestic manufacturing sector thereby reducing the
domestic price index since a smaller number of products consumed domestically are
now subject to trade costs. This relocation occurs because an increase in the own tari¤
makes the own country a more and the other country a less attractive business location
14 I follow Helpman and Krugman (1989: 143) in dening Homes terms-of-trade as p
p . One may
object that this is a too narrow denition since terms-of-trade e¤ects should really operate through
price indices in this environment. I show below that, even if such a wider denition is adopted, my
results can still not be reinterpreted as terms-of-trade e¤ects.
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for manufacturing rms. In particular, a unilateral increase in the own tari¤ implies that
manufacturing goods imported from the other country become more expensive relative
to domestic manufacturing goods so that domestic consumers shift expenditure towards
domestic manufacturing goods. As a consequence, domestic manufacturing rms sell
more thus making prots and foreign manufacturing rms sell less thus making losses.
This triggers entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of the foreign
manufacturing sector so that more of the worlds manufacturing goods are produced by
domestic rms.15 In equilibrium, the production relocation e¤ect dominates the import
price e¤ect because rms have to make zero prots due to free entry. Essentially, a coun-
trys increased attractiveness as a business location for manufacturing rms eventually
needs to be counterbalanced by increased domestic competition, i.e. a lower domestic
price index. To see this more clearly, consider Homes manufacturing market clearing
condition (20). If Home imposes a tari¤ against Foreign, this initially increases Homes
price index because of the import price e¤ect thereby boosting sales and prots of Home
rms. To restore equilibrium, rms have to relocate from Foreign to Home in the sense
that Homes manufacturing sector expands at the expense of Foreigns manufacturing
sector. Such a relocation reduces Homes price index and increases Foreigns price index
which makes it harder for Home rms to sell goods at Home but easier for Home rms to
sell goods at Foreign. Notice that therefore Homes post-tari¤ equilibrium price index
must be below its pre-tari¤ level. If it merely returned to its pre-tari¤ level, Home rms
could still export more than before and would therefore make positive prots. This
15Without the outside good, manufacturing labor supply would be inelastic so that there could be
no entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of the foreign manufacturing sector to
restore equilibrium. Instead, the domestic wage would increase relative to the foreign wage which would
imply an improvement in the domestic countrys terms-of-trade, just as in the neoclassical trade model.
See Gros (1987) for more on this.
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nding is summarized in proposition 1:16 17
Proposition 1 Suppose governments choose tari¤s simultaneously, Home maximizing
V and Foreign maximizing V . Then the unique Nash equilibrium tari¤ combination is
( ; ) = ( ; ) :
Proof. See appendix A3.
Observe second that this noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient since both gov-
ernments try to gain at the expense of one another. Essentially, if both governments
impose import tari¤s in an attempt to host more of the worlds manufacturing rms, no
government actually succeeds and tari¤s only push up import prices in both countries.
This is established more formally in the second proposition. This proposition also de-
scribes more generally which tari¤ combinations are e¢ cient which will be useful later
in the analysis:
Proposition 2 The set of Pareto-e¢ cient tari¤ combinations consists of all ( ; )
such that ( ; ) = (any possible  ; 0) or ( ; ) = (0; any possible ) :
Proof. See appendix A3.
Corollary 1 The trade war equilibrium tari¤s ( ; ) = ( ; ) are ine¢ cient.
16Notice that the production relocation e¤ect depends crucially on increasing returns to scale. Essen-
tially, it is a tari¤-induced change in the pattern of specialization brought about by changes in relative
market size which cannot arise in neoclassical models. While it can be illustrated most cleanly in the
simple setup developed here, it also arises in more complicated environments. Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), for example, identify it in a model with endogenous markups and heterogeneous rms.
17Notice that the production relocation e¤ect cannot be reinterpreted as a terms-of-trade e¤ect even
if Homes terms-of-trade are not dened as p
p but instead in terms of price indices. To see this, recall
that G1  = p1 n+(p)1  n and G1  = (p)1  n+ p1 n from equations (16) and (17). It is
therefore natural to dene Gexp as a world price index of Homes manufacturing exports and Gimp as
a world price index of Homes manufacturing imports, where G1 exp = p
1 n and G1 imp = p
1 n. In
terms of these world price indices, Homes terms-of-trade are then given by Gexp
Gimp
=
 
n
n
 1
1  . Since this
ratio is actually decreasing rather than increasing in Homes tari¤ because Home gains manufacturing
rms at Foreigns expense, the tari¤s e¤ect can therefore not be reinterpreted as a terms-of-trade gain
even using this wider denition of Homes terms-of-trade.
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Intuitively, Pareto improvements can only be achieved through bilateral tari¤ re-
ductions. This is because a unilateral tari¤ cut reduces the welfare of the liberalizing
country due to the production relocation e¤ect. However, bilateral tari¤ reductions are
only possible if tari¤s are positive in both countries so that Pareto improvements cannot
be achieved if the tari¤ is zero in at least one of the countries.
2.4 Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: the principle of reciprocity
Consider now trade policy, if tari¤s are set cooperatively subject to GATT/WTO reg-
ulations. Since the principle of nondiscrimination is trivially satised in a two-country
world, I focus only on the principle of reciprocity for now. I adopt Bagwell and Staigers
(1999) interpretation of this principle: generally speaking, reciprocity requires that trade
policy changes keep changes in imports equal across trading partners. However, this
principle has two particular applications in GATT/WTO practice and is not binding
to the same degree in both these applications. First, governments are required to seek
a balance of concessionsduring rounds of trade liberalization in the sense that they
cut tari¤s reciprocally. While this application is considered to be important in prac-
tice it is actually not encoded in GATT/WTO articles and is therefore not binding in
a legal sense. Second, governments are entitled to withdraw substantially equivalent
concessionsif a trading partner increases previously bound tari¤s in the sense that they
retaliate reciprocally. This right is encoded in GATT/WTO articles and therefore has
legal status.18
In the following, I demonstrate that the principle of reciprocity can be viewed as
helping countries overcome the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which
monotonically increases welfare in both countries. I develop the argument in three
18The principle of reciprocity is not explicitly dened in GATT/WTO articles. Bagwell and Staigers
(1999) denition characterizes the ideal guiding GATT/WTO negotiations. Since this ideal is hard
to implement in practice, governments often approximate it by using simple rules of thumb. See also
Bagwell and Staiger (2002: chapter 3), Dam (1970: 58-61, 87-91), Enders (2002), and Hoekman and
Kostecki (1995: 68-76).
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steps: rst, I show that reciprocity prevents production relocations between countries
and thereby neutralizes the production relocation e¤ect. Second, I demonstrate that,
as one consequence, reciprocity ensures that negotiated tari¤ concessions increase both
countrieswelfare monotonically. Third, I prove that, as another consequence, reci-
procity secures all negotiated tari¤ concessions by guaranteeing that no country has an
incentive to reverse them. Following the above discussion, I adopt the following formal
denition of reciprocity:
Denition 1 Dene a tari¤ change (d ; d) to be reciprocal if it is such that dTBM =
0, where TBM  EXPM   IMPM and EXPM (IMPM ) refers to the value of manu-
facturing exports (imports).
Thus, notice rst that the principle of reciprocity neutralizes the production reloca-
tion e¤ect. It can be shown that the number of manufacturing rms operating at Home
can be decomposed as follows:19
n =
L
qp
+
TBM
qp
(29)
The numerator is just the total expenditure on Home manufacturing goods by Home
and Foreign consumers, since this can be decomposed into the total expenditure on
Home and Foreign manufacturing goods by Home consumers (L), plus the total ex-
penditure on Home manufacturing goods by Foreign consumers (EXPM ), minus the
total expenditure on Foreign manufacturing goods by Home consumers (IMPM ). The
denominator is just the (constant) sales of Home manufacturing rms. Hence, if TBM
is xed by reciprocity, Homes (and hence also Foreigns) number of manufacturing
rms is xed as well. Intuitively, tari¤-induced changes in Home consumer expenditure
towards or away from Home manufacturing goods are then exactly o¤set by tari¤-
19For details see the proof of proposition 3.
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induced changes in Foreign consumer expenditure away from or towards these goods.20
This nding is summarized in proposition 3:
Proposition 3 Tari¤ changes leave the number of rms unchanged in both countries
if and only if they are reciprocal.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Observe second that reciprocal tari¤ concessions therefore increase both countries
welfare monotonically. To see this, recall that tari¤s a¤ect a countrys welfare through
two opposing e¤ects: the import price e¤ect which tends to make a countrys price
index increasing in its own tari¤; and the production relocation e¤ect which tends to
make a countrys price index decreasing in its own tari¤. As was discussed above,
the production relocation e¤ect normally dominates the import price e¤ect so that a
countrys price index is actually decreasing in its own tari¤. However, if the production
relocation e¤ect is neutralized by reciprocity, only the import price e¤ect remains so
that a countrys price index then becomes increasing in its own tari¤. This result is
summarized in proposition 4:
Proposition 4 Reciprocal trade liberalization monotonically increases welfare in both
countries.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Notice third that, by the same token, the principle of reciprocity also secures all
negotiated tari¤ concessions by guaranteeing that no country has an incentive to reverse
them. If a country responds reciprocally to any tari¤ increase of the other country, then
20This discussion is related to the analysis of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000) who study Venables
(1987) type trade policy e¤ects in an economic geography model developed by Martin and Rogers
(1995). They show that symmetric liberalization between asymmetric countries leads to international
rm relocations from the small to the large country. They also show that the large country needs to
liberalize faster than the small country if international rm relocations are to be prevented. See also
Baldwin et al. (2003).
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the other country no longer has an incentive to increase its tari¤ since such an increase
would only inate its price index due to the import price e¤ect. This is further illustrated
in proposition 5:
Proposition 5 Suppose tari¤s are set in the following two-stage game: in the rst
stage, governments choose tari¤s cooperatively according to some bargaining protocol. In
the second stage, Home gets the opportunity to deviate from the cooperative outcome by
increasing its tari¤ unilaterally. However, Foreign responds reciprocally to any unilateral
tari¤ increase by Home. Then, Home never deviates from the cooperative agreement in
the second stage.
Proof. See appendix A3.
In summary, the principle of reciprocity can thus be seen as helping governments es-
cape the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases
welfare in both countries. In fact, the principle of reciprocity not only helps govern-
ments escape the ine¢ cient equilibrium but also directly guides them to e¢ cient tari¤s.
This is because countries can liberalize their trade reciprocally unless one country has
completely eliminated all its tari¤s, which is su¢ cient for e¢ ciency, from proposition 2.
3 Three-country model
3.1 Setup
While the basic two-country model is thus useful to illustrate the overall purpose of
trade negotiations and the role played by the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, it
is too simple to shed light on the role played by the principle of nondiscrimination. For
this reason, I develop an extension of the basic model in this section. In particular, I
focus on the simplest possible setup that allows for discriminatory tari¤ setting. There
are now three countries: Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2. Home trades with both
18
Foreign 1 and Foreign 2, but Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 trade with Home only so that only
Home can set discriminatory tari¤s. Everything else is just as in the basic model. The
notation is a straightforward generalization of the one used before. For example, 1 is
now the tari¤ imposed by Home against imports from Foreign 1, 2 is now the tari¤
imposed by Foreign 2 against imports from Home, and G1 is the manufacturing price
index of Foreign 1.
3.2 No trade policy
The derivation of the equilibrium proceeds exactly as before and is thus not repeated
here in detail. Instead, I focus only on its key steps and present only the models key
relationships. As before, all rms charge c 1  p in equilibrium and the price indices
can be written as
G = p

n+ n1
1 
1 + n

2
1 
2
 1
1  (30)
G1 = p

n1 1 + n

1
 1
1  (31)
G2 = p

n1 2 + n

2
 1
1  (32)
Manufacturing market clearing requires
q = L
p 
G1 
+ L1
1 
1
p 
G1 1
+ L2
1 
2
p 
G1 2
(33)
q = L1 1
p 
G1 
+ L1
p 
G1 1
(34)
q = L1 2
p 
G1 
+ L2
p 
G1 2
(35)
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where the equations refer to Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2, respectively. These equa-
tions can be solved for the equilibrium price indices
G =

qp
L

 1
 1
(36)
G1 =

qp1
L1

 1
 1
(37)
G2 =

qp2
L2

 1
 1
(38)
where
  1  1 1   1 2 (39)
1  1  1 1   1 2
 
1 2   1 1

(40)
2  1  1 2   1 1
 
1 1   1 2

(41)

  1  (11)1    (22)1  (42)
It is easy to verify that ;1;2;
 > 0.21 These price indices can then be solved for
the equilibrium numbers of manufacturing rms
n =

qp

L

  L

1
1 
1
1
  L

2
1 
2
2

(43)
n1 =

qp
24L1
h
1  (22)1 
i
1
+
L2 (

12)
1 
2
  L
1 
1

35 (44)
n2 =

qp
24L2
h
1  (11)1 
i
2
+
L1 (1

2)
1 
1
  L
1 
2

35 (45)
21This follows from the parameter restriction on  needed to ensure that the manufacturing sector is
always active in all countries. See appendix A2 for this parameter restriction.
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These expressions again imply that the world number of manufacturing rms is constant.
Since there are now three countries, it is given by
n+ n1 + n

2 =
 (L+ L1 + L2)
qp
(46)
3.3 Noncooperative trade policy
Consider now again trade policy if tari¤s are set noncooperatively. Propositions 1 and
2 naturally generalize to the three-country model. As in proposition 1, all governments
choose maximum protection in the noncooperative equilibrium:
Proposition 6 Suppose governments choose tari¤s simultaneously, Home maximizing
V , Foreign 1 maximizing V 1 , and Foreign 2 maximizing V 2 . Then the unique Nash
equilibrium tari¤ combination is (1; 2; 1; 2) = ( ;  ;  ; ) :
Proof. See appendix A3.
As in proposition 2, this noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient:
Proposition 7 The set of Pareto-e¢ cient tari¤ combinations consists of all (1; 2; 1; 2)
such that (1; 2; 1; 2) = (any possible 1; any possible 2; 0; 0) or (1; 2; 1; 2) =
(0; 0; any possible 1; any possible 2).
Proof. See appendix A3.
Corollary 2 The trade war equilibrium tari¤s (1; 2; 1; 2) = ( ;  ;  ; ) are ine¢ -
cient.
However, the fact that propositions 1 and 2 generalize so naturally to the three-
country model conceals that tari¤s now have more complicated international impli-
cations. Besides the import price e¤ect, there is now both a bilateral as well as a
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multilateral production relocation e¤ect. The bilateral production relocation e¤ect is
an e¤ect between the two countries directly a¤ected by the tari¤ and is just the pro-
duction relocation e¤ect familiar from the basic model: for example, a tari¤ imposed by
Home against Foreign i leads to production relocations from Foreign i to Home since this
increases the sales of rms at Home and reduces the sales of rms at Foreign i thereby
making Home a more attractive business location for manufacturing rms. The multi-
lateral production relocation e¤ect is an additional e¤ect on the third country which is
not directly a¤ected by the tari¤. This multilateral production relocation e¤ect works
through changes in Homes price index: for example, since a tari¤ imposed by Home
against Foreign i leads to production relocations from Foreign i towards Home, Homes
price index falls. This implies that Homes market becomes more competitive which
makes it harder for rms in Foreign j to sell their products to Home. As a consequence,
the number of rms operating in Foreign j has to fall in equilibrium so that a tari¤
imposed by Home against Foreign i does not only lead to production relocations from
Foreign i to Home but also from Foreign j to Home.
3.4 Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: the principle of nondiscrim-
ination
Consider now again trade policy, if tari¤s are set cooperatively in GATT/WTO negoti-
ations. In the following, I demonstrate that the principle of reciprocity alone is now no
longer su¢ cient to help countries overcome the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in
a way which monotonically improves welfare in all countries. However, if the principle
of reciprocity is augmented with the principle of nondiscrimination they then together
serve this purpose. I develop this argument in four steps: rst, I show that the principle
of reciprocity neutralizes the bilateral production relocation e¤ect but not the multilat-
eral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations but that
it neutralizes both e¤ects if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. Second, I
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demonstrate that, as a consequence, the principle of reciprocity only ensures that ne-
gotiated tari¤ concessions increase all countrieswelfare monotonically if it is applied
in multilateral trade negotiations. Third, I show that the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion is a simple way to multilateralizetrade negotiations. And nally, I demonstrate
that under reciprocity and nondiscrimination negotiated tari¤ concessions are secured.
Adapting the earlier denition of reciprocity to the three country case, tari¤ changes
are now required to be bilaterally reciprocal in bilateral trade negotiations and multi-
laterally reciprocal in multilateral trade negotiations, where bilaterally reciprocal and
multilaterally reciprocal tari¤ changes are formally dened as follows:
Denition 2 Dene a tari¤ change (d1; d2; d1; d2) to be bilaterally reciprocal be-
tween Home and Foreign i if it is such that dTBMi = 0, where TB

Mi  EXP Mi  
IMP Mi and EXP

Mi (IMP

Mi) refers to the value of manufacturing exports (imports)
in Foreign i. Dene a tari¤ change (d1; d2; d1; d2) to be multilaterally reciprocal if
it is such that dTBM1 = dTB

M2 = 0:
Thus, notice rst that reciprocity neutralizes the bilateral production relocation
e¤ect but not the multilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral
trade negotiations but that it neutralizes both e¤ects if it is applied in multilateral trade
negotiations. To see this, observe that the number of manufacturing rms operating in
Foreign i can again be decomposed as follows:22
ni =
Li
qp
+
TBMi
qp
(47)
Hence, if Home and Foreign i change tari¤s in a bilaterally reciprocal way, the num-
ber of rms in Foreign i remains unchanged. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity
serves to eliminate the bilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral
22For details see the proof of proposition 8.
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trade negotiations. Also, if Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2 change tari¤s in a multilat-
erally reciprocal way, the number of rms in Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 (and hence also
Home) remains unchanged. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity serves to eliminate
both the bilateral as well as the multilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in
multilateral trade negotiations. Although not obvious from equation (47), the principle
of reciprocity is not su¢ cient to also eliminate the multilateral production relocation
e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations. This is because a bilaterally recip-
rocal tari¤ change between Home and Foreign i changes Homes price index thereby
a¤ecting the sales of rms in Foreign j. In particular, if Home and Foreign i liberalize
in a bilaterally reciprocal way, Homes price index falls which makes it harder for rms
in Foreign j to export their goods to Home. As a consequence, rms in Foreign j make
losses unless some production relocates to Home. This is summarized in proposition 8:
Proposition 8 Tari¤ changes leave the number of rms unchanged in all countries
if and only if they are multilaterally reciprocal. Moreover, bilaterally reciprocal trade
liberalization (trade protection) between Home and Foreign i leaves the number of rms
unchanged in Foreign i but increases (decreases) the number of rms at Home at the
expense of (to the benet of) Foreign j.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Observe second that, as a consequence, the principle of reciprocity only ensures that
negotiated tari¤ concessions increase all countrieswelfare monotonically if it is applied
in multilateral trade negotiations. If Home and Foreign i liberalize in a bilaterally
reciprocal way only the bilateral production relocation e¤ect is neutralized so that
Foreign i gains because of the import price e¤ect, Home gains because of the import price
e¤ect and the multilateral production relocation e¤ect, but Foreign j loses because of
the multilateral production relocation e¤ect. If, instead, Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2
liberalize in a multilaterally reciprocal way, the multilateral production relocation e¤ect
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is also neutralized so that all countries gain because of the import price e¤ect. This is
summarized in proposition 9:
Proposition 9 Multilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization monotonically increases wel-
fare in all countries. Bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between Home and Foreign
i monotonically increases welfare in Home and Foreign i but monotonically decreases
welfare in Foreign j.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Notice third that the principle of nondiscrimination is a simple way to multilater-
alizetrade negotiations.23 The reasoning for this is straightforward: if Home is forced
to impose the same tari¤ against Foreign 1 and Foreign 2, and both Foreign 1 and
Foreign 2 respond to tari¤ changes by Home in a bilaterally reciprocal way, both trade
balances are kept constant so that multilateral reciprocity prevails. This is summarized
in proposition 10:
Denition 3 Dene tari¤s to be nondiscriminatory if 1 = 2   :24
Proposition 10 If tari¤s are restricted to be nondiscriminatory, all bilaterally recip-
rocal tari¤ changes are also multilaterally reciprocal.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Observe nally that under reciprocity and nondiscrimination all negotiated tari¤
concessions are secured by guaranteeing that no country has an incentive to reverse
23Notice that Home needs to be forced to multilateralize trade negotiations. In particular, Home would
prefer liberalizing in a bilaterally reciprocal way rst vis-a-vis Foreign 1 and second vis-a-vis Foreign 2
to liberalizing in a multilaterally reciprocal way simultaneously vis-a-vis Foreign 1 and Foreign 2. This
is because, in the former case, Home would attract manufacturing production from rst Foreign 2 and
second Foreign 1, due to the multilateral production relocation e¤ect.
24This denition refers to the trade policy aspect of the principle of nondiscrimination - the most
favored nation (MFN) principle - as opposed to the domestic policy aspect of the principle of nondis-
crimination - the national treatment principle. See Horn (2006) for more on the national treatment
principle.
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them. If Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 respond reciprocally to any tari¤ increase by Home
above the negotiated tari¤ levels, then Home no longer has an incentive to increase its
tari¤. This is again because such an increase in tari¤s would only inate Homes price
index because of the import price e¤ect. This is summarized in proposition 11:25
Proposition 11 Suppose tari¤s are set in the following two-stage game. Throughout
all stages, Home is restricted to set nondiscriminatory tari¤s. In the rst stage, govern-
ments choose tari¤s cooperatively according to some bargaining protocol. In the second
stage, Home gets the opportunity to deviate from the cooperative outcome by increas-
ing its tari¤s unilaterally. However, Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 respond reciprocally to
any unilateral tari¤ increase by Home. Then Home never deviates from the cooperative
agreement in the second stage.
Proof. See appendix A3.
Overall, the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination can therefore be inter-
preted as jointly helping governments to escape the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilib-
rium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries. Notice, however,
that reciprocal trade liberalization no longer necessarily leads to e¢ cient tari¤s if the
principle of nondiscrimination is imposed. This is because reciprocity and nondiscrim-
ination can only be satised if all tari¤s are lowered simultaneously.26 But this is im-
possible if at least one of the tari¤s is equal to zero which is not su¢ cient for e¢ ciency,
from proposition 7. Recall, however, that the requirement to liberalize reciprocally is
not binding in a legal sense so that this feature of the principle of nondiscrimination
should not be overemphasized.
25Notice that the principle of nondiscrimination is actually not essential for this result. Even if only
the principle of reciprocity was imposed, Home would have no incentive to reverse negotiated tari¤
concessions against either country since this would inate its price index due to the import price e¤ect
and the multilateral production relocation e¤ect.
26This can be easily established by di¤erentiating the manufacturing market clearing conditions and
imposing nondiscrimination.
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4 Free trade agreements
GATT/WTO articles allow countries to sign free trade agreements as an important ex-
ception to the principle of nondiscrimination. Given that this principle is one of the two
fundamental pillars of the GATT/WTO system, this has raised concerns that free trade
agreements could undermine multilateral trade negotiations.27 Bagwell and Staigers
(1999) analysis strengthens these concerns. In their model, free trade agreements pose
a major threat to the functioning of GATT/WTO negotiations in the sense that they
eliminate the possibility to implement e¢ cient trade agreements. In this section, I
revisit these concerns in the context of my new tradetheory.
Suppose thus that Home and Foreign 1 sign a free trade agreement so that 1 =
1 = 0. Will reciprocal trade negotiations between Home and Foreign 2 guide countries
to the e¢ ciency frontier? It should be clear from the discussion in the previous sections
that this is indeed the case. Basically, Home and Foreign 2 can both improve their
welfare monotonically if they liberalize in a bilaterally reciprocal way. This is because
bilateral reciprocity eliminates the bilateral production relocation e¤ect and Home gains
at the expense of Foreign 1 due to the multilateral production relocation e¤ect. Such
bilaterally reciprocal liberalization can continue until 2 = 0 and/or 2 = 0 which,
together with the fact that 1 = 1 = 0, implies that e¢ cient tari¤s will be reached.
For the same reasons, neither Home nor Foreign 2 has an incentive to deviate from such
e¢ cient tari¤s so that the principle of reciprocity also secures e¢ cient tari¤s.
Of course, welfare no longer improves monotonically in all countries during the lib-
eralization process. If Home and Foreign 1 both gain from a free trade agreement,
Foreign 2 loses due to the multilateral production relocation e¤ect. And if Home and
Foreign 2 then liberalize in a bilaterally reciprocal way, Foreign 1 loses due to the multi-
lateral production relocation e¤ect. This again highlights the role of nondiscrimination
27More generally, the debate is whether preferential trade agreements are building blocsor stumbling
blocson the way to multilateral free trade. See Panagariya (2000) for a comprehensive survey of the
literature. See also Antras et al. (2007) for an interesting recent contribution to this literature.
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in this environment: to multilateralize trade negotiations in order to ensure that no
government gains at another governments expense during the liberalization process.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a new trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. I rst
demonstrated that tari¤s are ine¢ ciently high in the noncooperative equilibrium since
trade policy entails an international production relocation externality. I then showed
that GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondis-
crimination help countries overcome this ine¢ ciency by making them internalize this
externality.
This new tradetheory builds on a rationale for unilateral protection which can be
linked directly to trade policy debates. In the model, the higher the import tari¤, the
larger is the number of domestic manufacturing rms; the larger the number of domestic
manufacturing rms, the lower is the domestic price index; and the lower the domestic
price index, the higher is domestic welfare. Therefore, while trade policymakers are
assumed to maximize domestic welfare in the model, their tari¤ choices are exactly as
if they maximized the number of domestic manufacturing rms. And since the number
of domestic manufacturing rms translates directly into the number of domestic manu-
facturing jobs, this is equivalent to maximizing the number of domestic manufacturing
jobs.
While I thus hope to provide a plausible alternative to the standard neoclassical
theory of GATT/WTO negotiations, an empirical assessment of its relative importance
is left for future work. To guide such work it would be necessary to rst integrate
the neoclassical theory of GATT/WTO negotiations and the new trade theory of
GATT/WTO negotiations into a unied framework. Helpman and Krugmans (1985)
synthesis of neoclassical and new tradetheory would be a natural starting point for
such research.
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Besides, many of the arguments made in the context of the neoclassical theory of
GATT/WTO negotiations could be revisited in the context of this new tradetheory of
GATT/WTO negotiations. For example, one could introduce political economy forces
into the model as in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) to see whether GATT/WTO nego-
tiations can be viewed as a response to politically motivated protectionism. Or one
could consider labor and environmental standards as in Bagwell and Staiger (2001) to
assess whether they should be part of the GATT/WTO agreement. Or one could intro-
duce domestic production subsidies into the model as in Bagwell and Staiger (2006b)
to evaluate the GATT/WTO rules on production subsidies.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A1: E¤ects of allowing   !1
If   !1, propositions 1, 6, 8, and 9 would have to be modied as follows:
E¤ect on proposition 1: If   !1, ( ; ) would no longer be the unique Nash equi-
librium tari¤ combination but instead the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equi-
librium tari¤ combination. In particular, @G@  ! 0 if   ! 1 and @G

@  ! 0 if
  ! 1 as can be seen from equations (22) and (23). Therefore, all ( ; ) such that
( ; ) = (any  ; ) or ( ; ) = ( ; any ) would be Nash equilibrium tari¤ combina-
tions if   ! 1. However, only ( ; ) would be robust to small perturbations in the
governmentsstrategies because @G@ < 0 as soon as 
 < 1 and @G@ < 0 as soon as
 <1.
E¤ect on proposition 6: This is analogous to the e¤ect on proposition 1. If   !1,
( ;  ;  ; ) would no longer be the unique Nash equilibrium tari¤combination but instead
the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium tari¤ combination since all other
Nash equilibrium tari¤ combinations would not be robust to small perturbations in the
governmentsstrategies.
E¤ect on proposition 8: If   ! 1, the statement on bilaterally reciprocal trade
liberalization (trade protection) would have to be qualied. In particular, bilaterally
reciprocal trade liberalization (trade protection) between Home and Foreign i would then
leave the number of rms unchanged in Foreign i but increase (decrease) the number of
rms at Home at the expense of (to the benet of) Foreign j if  j < 1 and leave the
number of rms unchanged in all countries if  j  ! 1. The latter case arises because
@Gj
@ i
=
@Gj
@i
= 0 if  j  !1, as can be seen from equations (37) and (38).
E¤ect on proposition 9: This follows directly from the e¤ect on proposition 8. If
  ! 1, the statement on bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization would have to
be qualied. In particular, bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between Home
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and Foreign i would then monotonically increase welfare in Home and Foreign i but
monotonically decrease welfare in Foreign j if  j <1 and monotonically increase welfare
in Home and Foreign i but leave welfare unchanged in Foreign j if  j  !1. This would
imply that, starting at the noncooperative equilibrium, reciprocal trade liberalization
between Home and Foreign i would leave welfare una¤ected in Foreign j. However, any
subsequent bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between Home and Foreign j would
then still monotonically decrease welfare in Foreign i so that the multilateral production
relocation e¤ect would still have to be neutralized in order to eliminate all trade policy
externalities.
6.2 A2: Parameter restrictions
6.2.1 Two-country model
The equilibrium number of manufacturing rms operating at Home is given by n =

qp
h
L
1 1   
L1 
1 1 
i
from equation (24). Hence, the maximum value n can take
for all ( ; ; ) is nmax = qp
h
L
1 1 
i
and the minimum value n can take for all
( ; ; ) is nmin = qp
h
L  L1 
1 1 
i
. By symmetry, nmax =

qp
h
L
1 1 
i
and nmin =

qp
h
L   L1 
1 1 
i
. Therefore, the manufacturing sector is always active in both coun-
tries for all ( ; ; ) if and only if nmin > 0 and nmin > 0()  >
h
min(L;L)
L+L
i 1
1 
. Also,
the outside good sector is always active in both countries for all ( ; ; ) if and only if
Home is large enough to t nmax and Foreign is large enough to t nmax. This is the
case if nmaxl < L and nmaxl < L ()  < 1  1 .
6.2.2 Three-country model
The equilibrium number of manufacturing rms operating at Home is given by n =

qp
h
L
  
L1
1 
1
1
  L2
1 
2
2
i
from equation (43). Hence, the maximum value n can take
for all (1; 2; 1; 2; ) is nmax =

qp
h
L
1 21 
i
and the minimum value n can take for all
(1; 2; 

1; 

2; ) is nmin =

qp
h
L  L11 
1 1   
L2
1 
1 1 
i
. The equilibrium number of manu-
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facturing rms operating at Foreign i is given by ni =

qp
"
Li
h
1 (jj)
1 i
i
+
Lj(

i j)
1 
j
  L
1 
i

#
from equations (44 and 45). Hence, the maximum value ni can take for all (1; 2; 

1; 

2; )
is nimax =

qp
h
Li
1 1 
i
and the minimum value n can take for all (1; 2; 1; 2; )
is nimin =

qp
h
Li   L
1 
1 21 
i
. Therefore, the manufacturing sector is always active
in all countries for all (1; 2; 1; 2; ) if and only if nmin > 0 and n1min > 0 and
n2min > 0 ()  >

L
L+L1+L

2
 1
1 
and  >

L1
L+2L1
 1
1 
and  >

L2
L+2L2
 1
1 
. Also,
the outside good sector is always active in all countries for all (1; 2; 1; 2; ) if and
only if Home is large enough to t nmax and Foreign i is large enough to t nimax. This
is the case if nmaxl < L and n1maxl < L1 and n2maxl < L2 ()  < 1  21 .
6.3 A3: Proofs
6.3.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Given the form of V , V is maximized when G is minimized. Also, @G@ =
  () 
[1 ()1 ]G so that
@G
@ < 0 for all possible ( ; 
). Hence, choosing  =  is a
dominant strategy for Home. Similarly, choosing  =  is a dominant strategy for
Foreign. Thus, ( ; ) = ( ; ) is the unique Nash equilibrium tari¤ combination.
6.3.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. A tari¤ combination ( ; ) cannot be Pareto e¢ cient if there exist possi-
ble Pareto improving tari¤ changes (d ; d) at ( ; ). This includes tari¤ changes
(d ; d) such that dG < 0 and dG = 0. From total di¤erentiation, dG = @G@ d +
@G
@d
 and dG = @G

@ d +
@G
@ d
. Therefore, dG = 0 if d =   @@G @G@d so
that dG =
 
@G
@   @G

@
@
@G
@G
@

d along dG = 0. Notice that @G

@   @G

@
@
@G
@G
@ > 0
for all ( ; ). This is because @G@ =   (
) 
1 ()1 G,
@G
@ =
(1 1 ) 
(1 1 )[1 ()1 ]G,
@G
@ =
(1 1 ) 
(1 1 )[1 ()1 ]G
, and @G

@ =   (
) 
1 ()1 G
 so that @G

@   @G

@
@
@G
@G
@ =
G
 .
Hence, there exist Pareto improving tari¤ changes (d ; d) for all ( ; ). These
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(d ; d) are such that d < 0 and d < 0 and are thus possible if and only if
 > 0 and  > 0. Therefore, only ( ; ) such that ( ; ) = (any possible  ; 0) or
( ; ) = (0; any possible ) can be Pareto e¢ cient. It is easy to verify that for none
of these ( ; ) there exists another ( ; ) which makes one country better o¤ without
making the other country worse o¤. Therefore, they are also indeed Pareto e¢ cient.
6.3.3 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. By denition, TBM = p1 
 
n1 LG 1   n1 LG 1 so that TBM =
n1 L
n1 +n  
n1 L
n+n1  . Also,
nqp
 =
nL
n+n1  +
n1 L
n1 +n from Homes manufacturing
market clearing condition. Hence, n = Lqp +
TBM
qp which implies that dn = 0 if and only
if dTBM = 0. Finally, since n+ n =
(L+L)
qp , dn
 = 0 if and only if dn = 0:
6.3.4 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. Recall that G = p

n+ n1 
 1
1  and G = p

n1  + n
 1
1  from equa-
tions (16) and (17). Since reciprocal tari¤ changes leave the number of rms unchanged
in both countries, from proposition 3, reciprocal trade liberalization therefore monoton-
ically decreases both countriesprice indices.
6.3.5 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. Recall that G = p

n+ n1 

from equation (16). Since reciprocal tari¤
changes leave the number of rms unchanged in both countries, from proposition 3,
Homes price index is therefore increasing in its own tari¤ in the second stage.
6.3.6 Proof of proposition 6
Proof. @G@ i =  
(i

i )
 i

 G so that
@G
@ i
< 0 for all possible (1; 2; 1; 2). Hence, choos-
ing (1; 2) = ( ; ) is a dominant strategy for Home. Similarly,
@Gi
@i
=   (ii ) i
 Gi so
that @G

i
@i
< 0 for all possible (1; 2; 1; 2). Hence, choosing  i =  is also a dominant
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strategy for Foreign i. Thus, (1; 2; 1; 2) = ( ;  ;  ; ) is the unique Nash equilibrium
tari¤ combination.
6.3.7 Proof of proposition 7
Proof. A tari¤ combination (1; 2; 1; 2) cannot be Pareto e¢ cient if there exist
possible Pareto improving tari¤ changes (d1; d2; d1; d2) at (1; 2; 1; 2). This
includes tari¤ changes (d1; d2; d1; d2), d j = dj = 0, such that dG

i < 0 and
dG = dGj = 0. From total di¤erentiation, dG =
@G
@ i
d i +
@G
@i
di , dG

i =
@Gi
@ i
d i +
@Gi
@i
di , and dG

j =
@Gj
@ i
d i +
@Gj
@i
di . Therefore, dG = 0 if d i =  @ i@G @G@i d

i
and dGj = 0 if d i =   @ i@Gj
@Gj
@i
di . Notice that these two conditions are identical.
This is because @G@ i =  
(i

i )
 i

 G,
@G
@i
=
i
 
i

 G,
@Gi
@j
=
(jj)
 
j
1 
i

i
Gi , and
@Gi
@j
=  j
 
j 
1 
i

i
Gi so that  @ i@G @G@i =  
@ i
@Gj
@Gj
@i
. Hence, along dG = dGj = 0,
dGi =

@Gi
@i
  @Gi@ i
@ i
@G
@G
@i

di . Notice that
@Gi
@i
  @Gi@ i
@ i
@G
@G
@i
> 0 for all (1; 2; 1; 2).
This is because @G

i
@i
=   (ii ) i
 Gi and
@Gi
@ i
=

h
1 (jj)
1 i
 i G

i

i
which, together
with the derivatives given above, implies that @G

i
@i
  @Gi@ i
@ i
@G
@G
@i
=
Gi
i
. Hence, there
exist Pareto improving tari¤ changes (d1; d2; d1; d2), d j = dj = 0, such that
dGi < 0 and dG = dG

j = 0 for all (1; 2; 

1; 

2). These (d1; d2; d

1; d

2) are such
that d i < 0 and di < 0 and are thus possible if and only if  i > 0 and 

i > 0. This also
includes tari¤ changes (d1; d2; d1; d2), d j = di = 0, such that dG

i < 0 and dG =
dGj = 0. From total di¤erentiation, dG =
@G
@ i
d i +
@G
@j
dj , dG

i =
@Gi
@ i
d i +
@Gi
@j
dj ,
and dGj =
@Gj
@ i
d i +
@Gj
@j
dj . Therefore, dG = 0 if d

j =  
@j
@G
@G
@ i
d i and dGj = 0 if
dj =  
@j
@Gj
@Gj
@ i
d i. Notice from the derivatives given above that these two conditions
are identical. Hence, along dG = dGj = 0, dG

i =

@Gi
@ i
  @Gi@j
@j
@G
@G
@ i

d i. Notice that
@Gi
@ i
  @Gi@j
@j
@G
@G
@ i
> 0 for all (1; 2; 1; 2). This is because
@Gi
@ i
  @Gi@j
@j
@G
@G
@ i
=
 i
i
Gi ,
from the derivatives given above. Hence, there exist Pareto improving tari¤ changes
(d1; d2; d

1; d

2), d j = d

i = 0, such that dG

i < 0 and dG = dG

j = 0 for all
(1; 2; 

1; 

2). These (d1; d2; d

1; d

2) are such that d i < 0 and d

j < 0 and
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are thus possible if and only if  i > 0 and j > 0. Therefore, only (1; 2; 

1; 

2)
such that (1; 2; 1; 2) = (any possible 1; any possible 2; 0; 0) or (1; 2; 1; 2) =
(0; 0; any possible 1; any possible 2) can be Pareto e¢ cient. It is easy to verify that
for none of these (1; 2; 1; 2) there exists another (1; 2; 1; 2) which makes one
country better o¤ without making at least one of the other countries worse o¤. There-
fore, they are also indeed Pareto e¢ cient.
6.3.8 Proof of proposition 8
Proof. By denition, TBMi = p
1   ni1 i LG 1   n1 i LiG 1i  so that TBMi =
ni 
1 
i L
n+n1
1 
1 +n

2
1 
2
  n
1 
i L

i
n1 i +n

i
. Also, n

i qp
 =
ni 
1 
i L
n+n1
1 
1 +n

2
1 
2
+
niL

i
n1 i +n

i
from Foreign
imanufacturing market clearing condition. Hence, ni =
Li
qp +
TBMi
qp which implies
that dni = 0 if and only if dTB

Mi = 0. Also, since n+ n

1 + n

2 =
(L+L1+L2)
qp , dn = 0
if dn1 = dn2 = 0.
Moreover, if d j = dj = dn

i = 0,
dnj
d i
=
( 1) i L1 j ni
G2(1 )
"
L
j(1 
1 
j )
G
2(1 )
j
 L
1 
j (1 
1 
j )
G2(1 )
# from
Foreign js manufacturing market clearing condition. Also,
Lj(1 1 j )
G
2(1 )
j
>
L1 j (1 1 j )
G2(1 )
for all possible (1; 2; 1; 2; ) if and only if  >

L
L+Lj
 1
1 
which is true because
 >

L
L+2Lj
 1
1 
by assumption (c.f. appendix A2).
6.3.9 Proof of proposition 9
Proof. Recall that G = p

n+ n1
1 
1 + n

2
1 
2
 1
1  , G1 = p

n1 1 + n

1
 1
1  , and
G2 = p

n1 2 + n

2
 1
1  from equations (30 - 32). Since multilaterally reciprocal tari¤
changes leave the number of rms unchanged in all countries, from proposition 8, mul-
tilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization therefore monotonically reduces all countries
price indices. Since bilaterally reciprocal trade liberalization between Home and Foreign
i leaves the number of rms unchanged in Foreign i but increases the number of rms
at Home at the expense of Foreign j, from proposition 8, bilaterally reciprocal trade
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liberalization between Home and Foreign i therefore monotonically decreases the price
indices of Home and Foreign i but monotonically increases the price index of Foreign j.
6.3.10 Proof of proposition 10
Proof. If tari¤s are restricted to be nondiscriminatory, d1 = d2 so that purely bilat-
eral tari¤ changes between Home and Foreign 1 or Home and Foreign 2 are not possible.
Hence all bilaterally reciprocal tari¤ changes must then be bilaterally reciprocal between
Home and Foreign 1 and Home and Foreign 2. Since tari¤ changes which are bilaterally
reciprocal between Home and Foreign 1 and Home and Foreign 2 are also multilaterally
reciprocal this implies that all bilaterally reciprocal tari¤ changes must then also be
multilaterally reciprocal.
6.3.11 Proof of proposition 11
Proof. Recall that G = p

n+ n1
1 
1 + n

2
1 
2

from equation (30). Since reciprocal
tari¤ changes leave the number of rms unchanged in all countries if tari¤s are restricted
to be nondiscriminatory, from propositions 8 and 10, Homes price index is therefore
increasing in its own tari¤s in the second stage.
42
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
876 Monique Ebell 
Albrecht Ritschl 
Real Origins of the Great Depression: 
Monopoly Power, Unions and the American 
Business Cycle in the 1920s 
875 Jang Ping Thia Evolution of Locations, Specialisation and 
Factor Returns with Two Distinct Waves of 
Globalisation 
874 Monique Ebell 
Christian Haefke 
Product Market Deregulation and the U.S. 
Employment Miracle 
873 Monique Ebell Resurrecting the Participation Margin 
872 Giovanni Olivei 
Silvana Tenreyro 
Wage Setting Patterns and Monetary Policy: 
International Evidence 
871 Bernardo Guimaraes Vulnerability of Currency Pegs: Evidence from 
Brazil 
870 Nikolaus Wolf Was Germany Ever United? Evidence from 
Intra- and International Trade 1885 - 1993 
869 L. Rachel Ngai 
Roberto M. Samaniego 
Mapping Prices into Productivity in 
Multisector Growth Models 
868 Antoni Estevadeordal 
Caroline Freund 
Emanuel Ornelas 
Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization 
towards Non-Members? 
867 Alex Bryson 
Harald Dale-Olsen 
A Tale of Two Countries: Unions, Closures 
and Growth in Britain and Norway 
866 Arunish Chawla Multinational Firms, Monopolistic Competition 
and Foreign Investment Uncertainty 
865 Niko Matouschek 
Paolo Ramezzana 
Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
Labor Market Reforms, Job Instability, and the 
Flexibility of the Employment Relationship 
864 David G. Blanchflower 
Alex Bryson 
Union Decline in Britain 
863 Francesco Giavazzi 
Michael McMahon 
Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings 
862 Stephen Hansen 
Michael F. McMahon 
Delayed Doves: MPC Voting Behaviour of 
Externals 
861 Alex Bryson 
Satu Nurmi 
Private Sector Employment Growth, 1998-
2004: A Panel Analysis of British Workplaces 
860 Alejandro Cuñat 
Szabolks Deak 
Marco Maffezzoli 
Tax Cuts in Open Economies 
859 Bernd Fitzenberger 
Karsten Kohn 
Alexander Lembcke 
Union Density and Varieties of Coverage: The 
Anatomy of Union Wage Effects in Germany 
858 Dimitra Petropoulou International Trade, Minimum Quality 
Standards and the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
857 Andreas Georgiadis Efficiency Wages and the Economic Effects of 
the Minimum Wage: Evidence from a Low-
Wage Labour Market 
856 L. Rachel Ngai 
Christopher A. Pissarides 
Employment Outcomes in the Welfare State 
855 Carlo Rosa Talking Less and Moving the Market More: Is 
this the Recipe for Monetary Policy 
Effectiveness? Evidence from the ECB and the 
Fed 
854 Dimitra Petropoulou Competing for Contacts: Network 
Competition, Trade Intermediation and 
Fragmented Duopoly 
853 Barbara Petrongolo 
Christopher A Pissarides 
The Ins and Outs of European Unemployment 
852 Mirko Draca 
Steve Machin 
Robert Witt 
Panic on the Streets of London: Police, Crime 
and the July 2005 Terror Attacks 
851 Augustin de Coulon 
Jonathan Wadsworth 
On the Relative Gains to Immigration: A 
Comparison of the Labour Market Position of 
Indians in the USA, the UK and India 
850 Andreas Georgiadis HRM Practices and Knowledge Processes 
Outcomes: Empirical Evidence from a Quasi-
Experiment on UK SMEs in the Tourism 
Hospitality and Leisure Sector 
849 Mirabelle Muûls 
Dimitra Petropoulou 
A Swing-State Theory of Trade Protection in 
the Electoral College 
848 Dimitra Petropoulou Information Costs, Networks and 
Intermediation in International Trade 
847 Bernardo Guimaraes Optimal External Debt and Default 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7673  Fax  020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  
